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![]() ![]() But in each case the losses incurred in 19 at the hands of the Israel Defense Forces-and particularly, contrary to popular perception, the IDF’s ground forces-convinced Israel’s neighbors that the potential costs of another conventional war with Israel were no longer worth the risk. For Jordan, the 1967 War alone was enough to dissuade it from further aggression: as Ken Pollack has noted, after the war “the Jordanians recognized Israel’s military superiority and had no desire to repeat the experience of 1967.” For Egypt and Syria, by contrast, that recognition came a bit later. The trend reflects the fact that Israel’s neighbors never again attempted an all-out invasion. Data taken from the PRIO Battle Deaths 2.0 dataset and UCDP Battle-Related Deaths 5.0 dataset.Īfter 1973, the cumulative number of combatant battle deaths in Israel’s interstate wars flatlines. Indeed, Figure 1 shows just how effective Israel’s military performance in 19 was in deterring future interstate wars:įigure 1 shows the cumulative battle deaths in interstate wars in Israel since 1948. ![]() Israel’s victory in 1967 did not put an end to that goal, but the decisiveness of Israel’s victory-coupled with its successful recovery in the 1973 War-did prevent further efforts to achieve it. For two decades, from the 1948-1949 war on, Israel’s neighbors had sought to lay waste to the nascent Jewish state in the heart of the region. First, Israel’s victory in 1967 began a shift away from interstate warfare. ![]()
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